web-security-audit

name	web-security-audit
description	Expert guidance on identifying and mitigating common web vulnerabilities from a bug hunter's perspective. Covers access control, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, insecure file uploads, and JWT security with detailed protection strategies, implementation patterns, and verification checklists.
license	Complete terms in file LICENSE

Secure Coding Guide for Web Applications

Overview

This guide provides comprehensive secure coding practices for web applications. As an AI assistant, your role is to approach code from a bug hunter's perspective and make applications as secure as possible without breaking functionality.

Key Principles:

• Defense in depth: Never rely on a single security control
• Fail securely: When something fails, fail closed (deny access)
• Least privilege: Grant minimum permissions necessary
• Input validation: Never trust user input, validate everything server-side
• Output encoding: Encode data appropriately for the context it's rendered in

---

Access Control Issues

Access control vulnerabilities occur when users can access resources or perform actions beyond their intended permissions.

Core Requirements

For every data point and action that requires authentication:

1. User-Level Authorization

• Each user must only access/modify their own data
• No user should access data from other users or organizations
• Always verify ownership at the data layer, not just the route level

2. Use UUIDs Instead of Sequential IDs

• Use UUIDv4 or similar non-guessable identifiers
• Exception: Only use sequential IDs if explicitly requested by user

3. Account Lifecycle Handling

• When a user is removed from an organization: immediately revoke all access tokens and sessions
• When an account is deleted/deactivated: invalidate all active sessions and API keys
• Implement token revocation lists or short-lived tokens with refresh mechanisms

Authorization Checks Checklist

• Verify user owns the resource on every request (don't trust client-side data)
• Check organization membership for multi-tenant apps
• Validate role permissions for role-based actions
• Re-validate permissions after any privilege change
• Check parent resource ownership (e.g., if accessing a comment, verify user owns the parent post)

Common Pitfalls to Avoid

• IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference): Always verify the requesting user has permission to access the requested resource ID
• Privilege Escalation: Validate role changes server-side; never trust role info from client
• Horizontal Access: User A accessing User B's resources with the same privilege level
• Vertical Access: Regular user accessing admin functionality
• Mass Assignment: Filter which fields users can update; don't blindly accept all request body fields

Implementation Pattern

# Pseudocode for secure resource access
function getResource(resourceId, currentUser):
    resource = database.find(resourceId)

    if resource is null:
        return 404  # Don't reveal if resource exists

    if resource.ownerId != currentUser.id:
        if not currentUser.hasOrgAccess(resource.orgId):
            return 404  # Return 404, not 403, to prevent enumeration

    return resource

---

Client-Side Bugs

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Every input controllable by the user—whether directly or indirectly—must be sanitized against XSS.

Input Sources to Protect

Direct Inputs:

• Form fields (email, name, bio, comments, etc.)
• Search queries
• File names during upload
• Rich text editors / WYSIWYG content

Indirect Inputs:

• URL parameters and query strings
• URL fragments (hash values)
• HTTP headers used in the application (Referer, User-Agent if displayed)
• Data from third-party APIs displayed to users
• WebSocket messages
• postMessage data from iframes
• LocalStorage/SessionStorage values if rendered

Often Overlooked:

• Error messages that reflect user input
• PDF/document generators that accept HTML
• Email templates with user data
• Log viewers in admin panels
• JSON responses rendered as HTML
• SVG file uploads (can contain JavaScript)
• Markdown rendering (if allowing HTML)

Protection Strategies

1. Output Encoding (Context-Specific)

• HTML context: HTML entity encode (< → <)
• JavaScript context: JavaScript escape
• URL context: URL encode
• CSS context: CSS escape
• Use framework's built-in escaping (React's JSX, Vue's {{ }}, etc.)

2. Content Security Policy (CSP)

   Content-Security-Policy:
     default-src 'self';
     script-src 'self';
     style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
     img-src 'self' data: https:;
     font-src 'self';
     connect-src 'self' https://api.yourdomain.com;
     frame-ancestors 'none';
     base-uri 'self';
     form-action 'self';
   

• Avoid 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' for scripts
• Use nonces or hashes for inline scripts when necessary
• Report violations: report-uri /csp-report

3. Input Sanitization

• Use established libraries (DOMPurify for HTML)
• Whitelist allowed tags/attributes for rich text
• Strip or encode dangerous patterns

4. Additional Headers

• X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
• X-Frame-Options: DENY (or use CSP frame-ancestors)

---

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Every state-changing endpoint must be protected against CSRF attacks.

Endpoints Requiring CSRF Protection

Authenticated Actions:

• All POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE requests
• Any GET request that changes state (fix these to use proper HTTP methods)
• File uploads
• Settings changes
• Payment/transaction endpoints

Pre-Authentication Actions:

• Login endpoints (prevent login CSRF)
• Signup endpoints
• Password reset request endpoints
• Password change endpoints
• Email/phone verification endpoints
• OAuth callback endpoints

Protection Mechanisms

1. CSRF Tokens

• Generate cryptographically random tokens
• Tie token to user session
• Validate on every state-changing request
• Regenerate after login (prevent session fixation combo)

2. SameSite Cookies

   Set-Cookie: session=abc123; SameSite=Strict; Secure; HttpOnly
   

• Strict: Cookie never sent cross-site (best security)
• Lax: Cookie sent on top-level navigations (good balance)
• Always combine with CSRF tokens for defense in depth

3. Double Submit Cookie Pattern

• Send CSRF token in both cookie and request body/header
• Server validates they match

Edge Cases and Common Mistakes

• Token presence check: CSRF validation must NOT depend on whether the token is present, always require it
• Token per form: Consider unique tokens per form for sensitive operations
• JSON APIs: Don't assume JSON content-type prevents CSRF; validate Origin/Referer headers AND use tokens
• CORS misconfiguration: Overly permissive CORS can bypass SameSite cookies
• Subdomains: CSRF tokens should be scoped because subdomain takeover can lead to CSRF
• Flash/PDF uploads: Legacy browser plugins could bypass SameSite
• GET requests with side effects: Never perform state changes on GET
• Token leakage: Don't include CSRF tokens in URLs
• Token in URL vs Header: Prefer custom headers (X-CSRF-Token) over URL parameters

Verification Checklist

• Token is cryptographically random (use secure random generator)
• Token is tied to user session
• Token is validated server-side on all state-changing requests
• Missing token = rejected request
• Token regenerated on authentication state change
• SameSite cookie attribute is set
• Secure and HttpOnly flags on session cookies

---

Secret Keys and Sensitive Data Exposure

No secrets or sensitive information should be accessible to client-side code.

Never Expose in Client-Side Code

API Keys and Secrets:

• Third-party API keys (Stripe, AWS, etc.)
• Database connection strings
• JWT signing secrets
• Encryption keys
• OAuth client secrets
• Internal service URLs/credentials

Sensitive User Data:

• Full credit card numbers
• Social Security Numbers
• Passwords (even hashed)
• Security questions/answers
• Full phone numbers (mask them: --1234)
• Sensitive PII that isn't needed for display

Infrastructure Details:

• Internal IP addresses
• Database schemas
• Debug information
• Stack traces in production
• Server software versions

Where Secrets Hide (Check These!)

• JavaScript bundles (including source maps)
• HTML comments
• Hidden form fields
• Data attributes
• LocalStorage/SessionStorage
• Initial state/hydration data in SSR apps
• Environment variables exposed via build tools (NEXTPUBLIC, REACTAPP)

Best Practices

1. Environment Variables: Store secrets in .env files
2. Server-Side Only: Make API calls requiring secrets from backend only

---

Open Redirect

Any endpoint accepting a URL for redirection must be protected against open redirect attacks.

Protection Strategies

1. Allowlist Validation

   allowed_domains = ['yourdomain.com', 'app.yourdomain.com']
   
   function isValidRedirect(url):
       parsed = parseUrl(url)
       return parsed.hostname in allowed_domains
   

2. Relative URLs Only

• Only accept paths (e.g., /dashboard) not full URLs
• Validate the path starts with / and doesn't contain //

3. Indirect References

• Use a mapping instead of raw URLs: ?redirect=dashboard → lookup to /dashboard

Bypass Techniques to Block

Technique	Example	Why It Works
@ symbol	https://[e-mail]	Browser navigates to evil.com with legit.com as username
Subdomain abuse	https://legit.com.evil.com	evil.com owns the subdomain
Protocol tricks	javascript:alert(1)	XSS via redirect
Double URL encoding	%252f%252fevil.com	Decodes to //evil.com after double decode
Backslash	https://legit.com\@evil.com	Some parsers normalize \ to /
Null byte	https://legit.com%00.evil.com	Some parsers truncate at null
Tab/newline	https://legit.com%09.evil.com	Whitespace confusion
Unicode normalization	https://legіt.com (Cyrillic і)	IDN homograph attack
Data URLs	data:text/html,<script>...	Direct payload execution
Protocol-relative	//evil.com	Uses current page's protocol
Fragment abuse	https://legit.com#@evil.com	Parsed differently by different libraries

IDN Homograph Attack Protection

• Convert URLs to Punycode before validation
• Consider blocking non-ASCII domains entirely for sensitive redirects

---

Password Security

Password Requirements

• Minimum 8 characters (12+ recommended)
• No maximum length (or very high, e.g., 128 chars)
• Allow all characters including special chars
• Don't require specific character types (let users choose strong passwords)

Storage

• Use Argon2id, bcrypt, or scrypt
• Never MD5, SHA1, or plain SHA256

---

Server-Side Bugs

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Any functionality where the server makes requests to URLs provided or influenced by users must be protected.

Potential Vulnerable Features

• Webhooks (user provides callback URL)
• URL previews
• PDF generators from URLs
• Image/file fetching from URLs
• Import from URL features
• RSS/feed readers
• API integrations with user-provided endpoints
• Proxy functionality
• HTML to PDF/image converters

Protection Strategies

1. Allowlist Approach (Preferred)

• Only allow requests to pre-approved domains
• Maintain a strict allowlist for integrations

2. Network Segmentation

• Run URL-fetching services in isolated network
• Block access to internal network, cloud metadata

IP and DNS Bypass Techniques to Block

Technique	Example	Description
Decimal IP	http://2130706433	127.0.0.1 as decimal
Octal IP	http://0177.0.0.1	Octal representation
Hex IP	http://0x7f.0x0.0x0.0x1	Hexadecimal
IPv6 localhost	http://[::1]	IPv6 loopback
IPv6 mapped IPv4	http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]	IPv4-mapped IPv6
Short IPv6	http://[::]	All zeros
DNS rebinding	Attacker's DNS returns internal IP	First request resolves to external IP, second to internal
CNAME to internal	Attacker domain CNAMEs to internal	DNS points to internal hostname
URL parser confusion	http://attacker.com#@internal	Different parsing behaviors
Redirect chains	External URL redirects to internal	Follow redirects carefully
IPv6 scope ID	http://[fe80::1%25eth0]	Interface-scoped IPv6
Rare IP formats	http://127.1	Shortened IP notation

DNS Rebinding Prevention

1. Resolve DNS before making request
2. Validate resolved IP is not internal
3. Pin the resolved IP for the request (don't re-resolve)
4. Or: Resolve twice with delay, ensure both resolve to same external IP

Cloud Metadata Protection

Block access to cloud metadata endpoints:

• AWS: 169.254.169.254
• GCP: metadata.google.internal, 169.254.169.254, http://metadata
• Azure: 169.254.169.254
• DigitalOcean: 169.254.169.254

Implementation Checklist

• Validate URL scheme is HTTP/HTTPS only
• Resolve DNS and validate IP is not private/internal
• Block cloud metadata IPs explicitly
• Limit or disable redirect following
• If following redirects, validate each hop
• Set timeout on requests
• Limit response size
• Use network isolation where possible

---

Insecure File Upload

File uploads must validate type, content, and size to prevent various attacks.

Validation Requirements

1. File Type Validation

• Check file extension against allowlist
• Validate magic bytes/file signature match expected type
• Never rely on just one check

2. File Content Validation

• Read and verify magic bytes
• For images: attempt to process with image library (detects malformed files)
• For documents: scan for macros, embedded objects
• Check for polyglot files (files valid as multiple types)

3. File Size Limits

• Set maximum file size server-side
• Configure web server/proxy limits as well
• Consider per-file-type limits (images smaller than videos)

Common Bypasses and Attacks

Attack	Description	Prevention
Extension bypass	shell.php.jpg	Check full extension, use allowlist
Null byte	shell.php%00.jpg	Sanitize filename, check for null bytes
Double extension	shell.jpg.php	Only allow single extension
MIME type spoofing	Set Content-Type to image/jpeg	Validate magic bytes
Magic byte injection	Prepend valid magic bytes to malicious file	Check entire file structure, not just header
Polyglot files	File valid as both JPEG and JavaScript	Parse file as expected type, reject if invalid
SVG with JavaScript	<svg onload="alert(1)">	Sanitize SVG or disallow entirely
XXE via file upload	Malicious DOCX, XLSX (which are XML)	Disable external entities in parser
ZIP slip	../../../etc/passwd in archive	Validate extracted paths
ImageMagick exploits	Specially crafted images	Keep ImageMagick updated, use policy.xml
Filename injection	; rm -rf / in filename	Sanitize filenames, use random names
Content-type confusion	Browser MIME sniffing	Set X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

Magic Bytes Reference

Type	Magic Bytes (hex)
JPEG	FF D8 FF
PNG	89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A
GIF	47 49 46 38
PDF	25 50 44 46
ZIP	50 4B 03 04
DOCX/XLSX	50 4B 03 04 (ZIP-based)

Secure Upload Handling

1. Rename files: Use random UUID names, discard original
2. Store outside webroot: Or use separate domain for uploads
3. Serve with correct headers:

• Content-Disposition: attachment (forces download)
• X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
• Content-Type matching actual file type

4. Use CDN/separate domain: Isolate uploaded content from main app
5. Set restrictive permissions: Uploaded files should not be executable

---

SQL Injection

SQL injection occurs when user input is incorporated into SQL queries without proper handling.

Prevention Methods

1. Parameterized Queries (Prepared Statements) — PRIMARY DEFENSE

-- VULNERABLE
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId

-- SECURE
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?"
execute(query, [userId])

2. ORM Usage

• Use ORM methods that automatically parameterize
• Be cautious with raw query methods in ORMs
• Watch for ORM-specific injection points

3. Input Validation

• Validate data types (integer should be integer)
• Whitelist allowed values where applicable
• This is defense-in-depth, not primary defense

Injection Points to Watch

• WHERE clauses
• ORDER BY clauses (often overlooked—can't use parameters, must whitelist)
• LIMIT/OFFSET values
• Table and column names (can't parameterize—must whitelist)
• INSERT values
• UPDATE SET values
• IN clauses with dynamic lists
• LIKE patterns (also escape wildcards: %, _)

Additional Defenses

• Least privilege: Database user should have minimum required permissions
• Disable dangerous functions: Like xp_cmdshell in SQL Server
• Error handling: Never expose SQL errors to users

---

XML External Entity (XXE)

XXE vulnerabilities occur when XML parsers process external entity references in user-supplied XML.

Vulnerable Scenarios

Direct XML Input:

• SOAP APIs
• XML-RPC
• XML file uploads
• Configuration file parsing
• RSS/Atom feed processing

Indirect XML:

• JSON/other format converted to XML server-side
• Office documents (DOCX, XLSX, PPTX are ZIP with XML)
• SVG files (XML-based)
• SAML assertions
• PDF with XFA forms

Prevention by Language/Parser

Java:

DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);

Python (lxml):

from lxml import etree
parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, no_network=True)
# Or use defusedxml library

PHP:

libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);
// Or use XMLReader with proper settings

Node.js:

// Use libraries that disable DTD processing by default
// If using libxmljs, set { noent: false, dtdload: false }

.NET:

XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();
settings.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit;
settings.XmlResolver = null;

XXE Prevention Checklist

• Disable DTD processing entirely if possible
• Disable external entity resolution
• Disable external DTD loading
• Disable XInclude processing
• Use latest patched XML parser versions
• Validate/sanitize XML before parsing if DTD needed
• Consider using JSON instead of XML where possible

---

Path Traversal

Path traversal vulnerabilities occur when user input controls file paths, allowing access to files outside intended directories.

Vulnerable Patterns

# VULNERABLE
file_path = "/uploads/" + user_input
file_path = base_dir + request.params['file']
template = "templates/" + user_provided_template

Prevention Strategies

1. Avoid User Input in Paths

# Instead of using user input directly
# Use indirect references
files = {'report': '/reports/q1.pdf', 'invoice': '/invoices/2024.pdf'}
file_path = files.get(user_input)  # Returns None if invalid

2. Canonicalization and Validation

import os

def safe_join(base_directory, user_path):
    # Ensure base is absolute and normalized
    base = os.path.abspath(os.path.realpath(base_directory))

    # Join and then resolve the result
    target = os.path.abspath(os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base, user_path)))

    # Ensure the commonpath is the base directory
    if os.path.commonpath([base, target]) != base:
        raise ValueError("Error!")

    return target

3. Input Sanitization

• Remove or reject .. sequences
• Remove or reject absolute path indicators (/, C:)
• Whitelist allowed characters (alphanumeric, dash, underscore)
• Validate file extension if applicable

Path Traversal Checklist

• Never use user input directly in file paths
• Canonicalize paths and validate against base directory
• Restrict file extensions if applicable
• Test with various encoding and bypass techniques

---

Security Headers Checklist

Include these headers in all responses:

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
Content-Security-Policy: [see XSS section]
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Cache-Control: no-store (for sensitive pages)

---

JWT Security

JWT misconfigurations can lead to full authentication bypass and token forgery.

Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability	Prevention
alg: none attack	Always verify algorithm server-side, reject none
Algorithm confusion	Explicitly specify expected algorithm, never derive from token
Weak HMAC secrets	Use 256+ bit cryptographically random secrets
Missing expiration	Always set exp claim
Token in localStorage	Store in httpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict cookies, never localStorage

Secure Implementation

// 1. SIGNING
// Always use environment variables for secrets
const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;

const token = jwt.sign(
  {
    sub: userId,
    iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 15 * 60, // 15 mins (Short-lived)
    jti: crypto.randomUUID(), // Unique ID for revocation/blacklisting
  },
  secret,
  {
    algorithm: "HS256",
  },
);

// 2. SENDING (Cookie Best Practices)
// Protect against XSS and CSRF
res.cookie("token", token, {
  httpOnly: true,
  secure: true,
  sameSite: "strict",
});

// 3. VERIFYING
// CRITICAL: Whitelist the allowed algorithm
jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ["HS256"] }, (err, decoded) => {
  if (err) {
    // Handle invalid token
  }
  // Trust the payload
});

JWT Checklist

• Algorithm explicitly specified on verification (never trust token header)
• alg: none rejected
• Secret is 256+ bits of random data (not a password or phrase)
• exp claim always set and validated
• Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not localStorage/sessionStorage)
• Refresh token rotation implemented (old refresh token invalidated on use)

---

API Security

Mass Assignment

Accepting unfiltered request bodies can lead to privilege escalation.

// VULNERABLE — user can set { role: "admin" } in request body
User.update(req.body);

// SECURE — whitelist allowed fields
const allowed = ["name", "email", "avatar"];
const updates = pick(req.body, allowed);
User.update(updates);

This applies to any ORM/framework — always explicitly define which fields a request can modify.

GraphQL

Vulnerability	Prevention
Introspection in production	Disable introspection in production environments.
Query depth attack	Implement query depth limiting (e.g., maximum of 10 levels).
Query complexity attack	Calculate and enforce strict query cost limits.
Batching attack	Limit the number of operations allowed per single request.

const server = new ApolloServer({
  introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production",
  validationRules: [depthLimit(10), costAnalysis({ maximumCost: 1000 })],
});

---

General Security Principles

When generating code, always:

1. Validate all input server-side — Never trust client-side validation alone
2. Use parameterized queries — Never concatenate user input into queries
3. Encode output contextually — HTML, JS, URL, CSS contexts need different encoding
4. Apply authentication checks — On every endpoint, not just at routing
5. Apply authorization checks — Verify the user can access the specific resource
6. Use secure defaults
7. Handle errors securely — Don't leak stack traces or internal details to users
8. Keep dependencies updated — Use tools to track vulnerable dependencies

When unsure, choose the more restrictive/secure option and document the security consideration in comments.