菜单
Find and prove misconfigured cloud object storage (S3/GCS/Azure Blob). Load when assets load from *.s3.amazonaws.com, storage.googleapis.com, *.blob.core.windows.net, bucket-looking hostnames, or "bucket". Signals: public-read/list, unauthenticated writes, predictable bucket names.
默认使用会先检查来源的 Prompt；你也可以切换为直接命令，或下载本地副本。
决定是否安装前，请先阅读 SKILL.md，以及 SkillsMP 当前展示的配套文件。
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill cloud-s3-exposure命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.
Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".
Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cloud-s3-exposure |
| description | Find and prove misconfigured cloud object storage (S3/GCS/Azure Blob). Load when assets load from *.s3.amazonaws.com, storage.googleapis.com, *.blob.core.windows.net, bucket-looking hostnames, or "bucket". Signals: public-read/list, unauthenticated writes, predictable bucket names. |
| domain | cloud |
| type | technique |
| stability | learning |
| modes | ["bugbounty"] |
| severity | high |
| owasp | ["A05:2021-Security-Misconfiguration"] |
| cwe | ["CWE-732"] |
| mitre | ["T1530"] |
| tools | ["awscli","s3scanner","gcpbucketbrute"] |
| schema_version | 1 |
The app stores files in S3/GCS/Azure Blob and the bucket's ACL/policy is too open — public listing, public read of private objects, or (worst) unauthenticated write.
Object-storage ACLs are easy to get wrong: "public" gets applied at the bucket level, or an
IAM policy grants s3:ListBucket/GetObject/PutObject to *. Predictable names
(companyname-backups, -assets, -dev) make discovery trivial.
company, company-prod, company-backups, region suffixes).aws s3 ls s3://bucket --no-sign-request (list) and
aws s3 cp s3://bucket/file . --no-sign-request (read). --no-sign-request = anonymous.aws s3 cp poc.txt s3://bucket/ --no-sign-request — a successful anonymous write is critical (defacement/malware hosting).gsutil ls gs://bucket / anonymous HTTPS GET; Azure ?comp=list on the container.s3scanner/gcpbucketbrute on name lists — respect scope & rate.Anonymous listing/read of non-public objects, or a successful anonymous write of a harmless proof file (then remove it). Capture the exact command + response.
AWS S3 security docs; "hacking the cloud" S3 guides; s3scanner README.