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Write portable detections as Sigma rules and map them to MITRE ATT&CK, then convert to your SIEM. Load for blue-team/detection-engineering tasks: "write a detection", "sigma rule", "alert on", turning an offensive technique or an incident into a repeatable detection.
默认使用会先检查来源的 Prompt；你也可以切换为直接命令，或下载本地副本。
决定是否安装前，请先阅读 SKILL.md，以及 SkillsMP 当前展示的配套文件。
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill defense-detection-sigma命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
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Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.
Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".
Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.
| name | defense-detection-sigma |
| description | Write portable detections as Sigma rules and map them to MITRE ATT&CK, then convert to your SIEM. Load for blue-team/detection-engineering tasks: "write a detection", "sigma rule", "alert on", turning an offensive technique or an incident into a repeatable detection. |
| domain | defense |
| type | technique |
| stability | learning |
| modes | ["defense"] |
| severity | info |
| mitre | ["T1059","T1078"] |
| tools | ["sigma","sigmac","chainsaw"] |
| schema_version | 1 |
You need a detection that survives a SIEM change: express the logic once in Sigma (a generic YAML rule format), then compile to Splunk/Elastic/Sentinel/etc. Pairs with offensive skills — every technique you learn to run, you can learn to catch.
Sigma abstracts log-source + condition from backend query syntax, so one rule ports across SIEMs and reviews cleanly. Mapping to ATT&CK gives coverage you can measure and gaps you can see.
w3wp.exe, certutil download, new service creation), not a single hash/IP that rotates.logsource block (product, category).detection: with a selection: map (field → value/wildcards) and a
condition:; add falsepositives:, level:, and tags: [attack.tXXXX].filter: blocks for known-good (admin tools, scanners) and set a
sane level; validate against real logs (chainsaw hunt/sigmac to your backend).mimikatz.exe) is brittle — detect the behaviour (LSASS access).falsepositives/tuning = an alert nobody trusts; noisy rules get muted and miss real hits.The rule fires on a controlled reproduction of the technique and stays quiet on benign baseline activity, and it compiles cleanly to your SIEM query.
SigmaHQ spec & rule repo; MITRE ATT&CK; Florian Roth detection-engineering guidance.