defense-dfir-triage

name	defense-dfir-triage
description	First-response DFIR triage: scope an incident, collect volatile evidence, and find attacker activity on Linux/Windows. Load on "incident", "we got breached", "investigate this host", "IOCs", suspected compromise, or forensic triage. Signals: alert to investigate, suspicious host, "what happened".
domain	defense
type	methodology
stability	learning
modes	["defense"]
severity	info
mitre	["T1078","T1059","T1053"]
tools	["velociraptor","chainsaw","hayabusa","volatility"]
schema_version	1

DFIR triage & investigation

When it applies

A host or account is suspected compromised and you need to determine what happened, scope it, and preserve evidence — quickly, without destroying volatile data.

Why it works

Attacker activity leaves artifacts across a known set of locations (execution, persistence, logons, network). A disciplined order — preserve volatile first, then map to ATT&CK — gives a timeline and scope instead of a guess.

Method

1. Preserve volatile first (order of volatility): memory (if warranted), then running processes, network connections, logged-on users — before shutdown/changes.
2. Establish the timeline: parse Windows event logs (chainsaw/hayabusa with Sigma) or Linux logs/auth; look for initial access, execution, and lateral movement times.
3. Check the usual artifacts:
   • Execution: prefetch/shimcache/amcache (Win), bash history//var/log (Linux), scheduled tasks/cron.
   • Persistence: services, run keys, WMI, startup, cron, systemd units, SSH keys.
   • Accounts/logons: new users, 4624/4625, sudo, privilege changes.
   • Network: current connections, DNS, beaconing patterns.
4. Collect at scale with Velociraptor (hunts across hosts) to scope beyond one machine.
5. Map findings to ATT&CK, extract IOCs, and hand detections to defense-detection-sigma.

Gotchas

• Don't reboot/"clean" before capturing volatile evidence — you'll lose the memory/process picture.
• Correlate timestamps across sources (watch timezones/clock skew) to build a real timeline.
• Scope before remediating: one host is rarely the whole incident — hunt the IOCs fleet-wide.

Verify success

A timeline of attacker actions with initial access, persistence, and scope identified, plus IOCs and mapped ATT&CK techniques ready for detection/containment.

References

SANS DFIR posters; Velociraptor docs; chainsaw/hayabusa; MITRE ATT&CK.