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Hunt for attacker activity in logs — auth, web, cloud, endpoint — with concrete queries and what to look for. Load for blue-team log/SIEM hunting, "analyze these logs", "find the attack", triage of auth/web/cloud logs, or building hunts. Signals: log files/SIEM, "what happened", IOC hunting.
默认使用会先检查来源的 Prompt；你也可以切换为直接命令，或下载本地副本。
决定是否安装前，请先阅读 SKILL.md，以及 SkillsMP 当前展示的配套文件。
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill defense-log-analysis命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.
Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".
Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | defense-log-analysis |
| description | Hunt for attacker activity in logs — auth, web, cloud, endpoint — with concrete queries and what to look for. Load for blue-team log/SIEM hunting, "analyze these logs", "find the attack", triage of auth/web/cloud logs, or building hunts. Signals: log files/SIEM, "what happened", IOC hunting. |
| domain | defense |
| type | technique |
| stability | learning |
| modes | ["defense"] |
| severity | info |
| mitre | ["T1078","T1110","T1190","T1059"] |
| tools | ["splunk","elastic","jq","zeek","sigma"] |
| schema_version | 1 |
You have logs (or a SIEM) and need to find attacker activity — during triage, IR, or proactive hunting. Pairs with each offensive skill: know the attack, hunt its footprint.
Attacks leave patterns across log sources. Hunting hypothesis-first (pick a technique → query its signature → pivot on hits) beats scrolling. The same ATT&CK technique shows up in auth, web, cloud, and endpoint logs in characteristic ways.
web-rate-limit-bypass);
logins from new geos/ASNs/impossible travel; new/again-enabled accounts; MFA fatigue (many prompts)./admin, /api, .git, requests to metadata IPs (SSRF).ConsoleLogin/AssumeRole anomalies, IAM changes
(CreateAccessKey, AttachUserPolicy, setIamPolicy), GetSecretValue bursts, unusual regions,
iam:PassRole + deploy (→ cloud-iam-privesc).w3wp→cmd), certutil/curl downloads, encoded
PowerShell, new services/scheduled tasks (→ defense-dfir-triage).defense-detection-sigma), don't just eyeball once.A concrete finding: an attacker action identified with the query that found it, pivoted to scope (accounts/hosts/timeline), and IOCs extracted for detection/containment.
Splunk/Elastic search docs; MITRE ATT&CK; SANS hunting; Sigma for portable detections.