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| name | review-pr |
| description | Review a GitHub pull request or local Git range against QuestDB client library coding standards |
| argument-hint | [PR number or URL | --range=<base>..<head>] [--level=0..3] |
| allowed-tools | Bash, Read, Grep, Glob, Agent |
Review the target in $ARGUMENTS. Parse exactly one PR number/URL or
--range=<base>..<head> target. An omitted range head reviews the working tree,
including uncommitted changes. Ask for a target when none is supplied and reject
ambiguous invocations containing both forms. Use Bash for read-only Git/GitHub
queries and test execution; do not edit files, commit, or push.
You are a senior QuestDB engineer performing a blocking code review. The QuestDB client library is mission-critical software — bugs can cause data loss, silent data corruption, or crashes in customer applications across Rust, C, C++, Python, and downstream language bindings. There is zero tolerance for correctness issues, resource leaks, undefined behavior, or unsound FFI. Be critical, thorough, and opinionated. Your job is to catch problems before they ship, not to be nice.
A review that blocks on everything blocks on nothing. Report every verified issue, but reserve blocking severity for reachable defects with material user impact. Approval is the expected result when the correctness and test gates pass.
usize::MAX, NUL-byte injection through an API that already rejects it, panics behind validation guards), it is not a real finding — drop it. Focus on bugs that real workloads can trigger, not theoretical edge cases.debug_assert! and assert! are valid guards for invariants that indicate library-internal bugs. Do NOT flag them as insufficient — they are the preferred mechanism for conditions that should never occur given the FFI contracts. Only flag an assert!/debug_assert! if the condition can plausibly be triggered by callers honoring the documented contract..last_error or an error inbox), not write .failed, delete SFA files, or mark the slot permanently dead. Only proven local unrecoverability, such as corrupt SFA segments, may poison an orphan slot./lifecycle/switch with an already-open connection, not only kill/restart failover.Parse $ARGUMENTS for a level token: --level=N, -lN, or a bare single digit 0-3. If no level is given, default to 0. Strip the level and range tokens before feeding a PR target to gh commands.
The level controls how much of the review below actually runs. Lower levels keep the same review spirit — adversarial, blocking, no praise — but cut the breadth of the analysis. Higher levels have significantly higher token cost; reserve level 3 for high-stakes PRs (FFI ABI changes, ILP wire format, authentication/TLS, public C/C++ headers, new unsafe blocks, sender or buffer state-machine changes).
| Level | What runs |
|---|---|
| 0 (default) | Steps 1, 2, 2.4, 2.5e, 2.6, 4. Skip the rest of Step 2.5 and agent fanout. Review inline, applying the Step 3b admission rules from a blank evidence record before writing each finding. |
| 1 | Adds Step 2.5a (semantic delta only — skip 2.5b/2.5c/2.5d). In Step 3, launch only Agent 1 (correctness), Agent 2 (Rust safety), Agent 7 (tests), and Agent 8 (public API ergonomics & cross-surface consistency) in parallel. Skip all other agents. Apply Step 3b inline to their candidates. |
| 2 | Full Step 2.5, but in 2.5b restrict the callsite inventory to pub/pub(crate) Rust symbols plus every #[no_mangle]/extern "C" export. In Step 3, launch Agents 1-8. Skip Agent 9 (cross-context) and Agent 10 (adversarial fresh-context). Step 3b uses a single batched verification agent for all findings instead of one per finding. |
| 3 | Every step below as written, all 10 agents, per-finding verification. The full mission-critical pass. |
State the chosen level in one line at the start of the review so the user knows what they're getting (e.g., "Reviewing PR #141 at level 2"). If the level was defaulted, mention that level 3 exists for full review.
Every mode must establish $BASE, the revision against which attribution is
measured. A behavioral finding without an identical-trigger base comparison is
not attributable to the change.
For a PR, capture $PR after stripping the level token, then fetch context and base:
PR='<PR number or URL from $ARGUMENTS, with any --level=N / -lN / bare-digit level token removed>'
gh pr view "$PR" --json number,title,body,labels,state
gh pr diff "$PR"
gh pr view "$PR" --comments
BASE=$(gh pr view "$PR" --json baseRefOid --jq .baseRefOid)
HEAD=$(gh pr view "$PR" --json headRefOid --jq .headRefOid)
For --range=<base>..<head>, set $BASE; use git diff "$BASE...$HEAD" when
the head is present. With an omitted head, inspect git diff "$BASE",
git status --porcelain, and relevant untracked files because they do not
appear in the diff.
Skip this step in local-range mode and state that no PR metadata exists.
Check:
Fixes #NNN or a link to the issue is presentFor every changed submodule pointer, determine whether the new commit is already
on the submodule's default branch. Classify it as UPSTREAM-SYNC (contents are
out of scope; review only integration in this diff), OFF-DEFAULT (contents are
part of this logical change), or UNRESOLVED (treat as OFF-DEFAULT and disclose
the missing provenance). Record each verdict for the final summary.
Before launching review agents, produce a structured change surface map. This step is mandatory and must use Grep/Glob — do not reason about callsites from memory. The output of this step is required input for every agent in Step 3.
For every modified or added function, method, trait, struct field, public constant, or FFI export, write:
questdb::ingress::Sender::flush, line_sender_buffer_column_f64)&self vs &mut self), ordering/idempotency guarantees, allocation behavior, thread-safety, FFI ownership semantics (caller-owned vs callee-owned)"Refactored", "cleaned up", "improved", "simplified" are not acceptable deltas. State the actual behavioral difference. If nothing semantically changed, write "no behavioral change" — but only after checking, not as a default.
For every changed symbol that is pub, pub(crate), #[no_mangle], extern "C", exported in the C header, or referenced from the C++ wrapper, run Grep across the entire repository to find every callsite, implementation, override, or reference outside the diff.
Produce a list grouped by file. Search at minimum:
grep -r 'symbol_name' questdb-rs/ questdb-rs-ffi/grep -rn 'impl.*TraitName' questdb-rs/grep -rn 'symbol_name' include/questdb/ingress/grep -rn 'symbol_name' include/questdb/ingress/*.hppgrep -rn 'symbol_name' cpp_test/grep -rn 'symbol_name' system_test/grep -rn 'symbol_name' examples/grep -rn 'symbol_name' questdb-rs/src/A changed pub/pub(crate)/#[no_mangle] symbol with zero recorded Grep calls in the trace is a skill violation. The model is not allowed to assert "this is only used here" without showing the search.
For each changed symbol, walk this checklist and write one line per item, stating before vs after:
Result::Err variants returned and which ? chains propagate themSend / Sync bounds and whether the value can cross threadsconst-ness, length parameters, NUL-termination expectationsEnd this step with an explicit list of "places this change is visible from but the diff does not touch". This is the highest-priority input for the bug-hunting agents in Step 3.
Group the callsites from 2.5b by execution context. Typical contexts in this codebase:
extern "C" function in questdb-rs-ffi/src/lib.rs that calls (transitively) into the changed codeBuffer::column_*, Buffer::symbol, Buffer::at* and their callersSender::flush*, HTTP/TCP/ILP transportsSenderBuilder, conf string parsers in questdb-rs/src/ingress/conf.rsquestdb-rs/src/ingress/tls.rs, basic auth, token authinclude/questdb/ingress/*.hppcpp_test/test_line_sender.cppsystem_test/test.py, system_test/fixture.py, ctypes shims in system_test/questdb_line_sender.pyexamples/ programs that link the C/C++ APIEvery entry on this list must be reviewed in Step 3.
This sub-step runs at every level, including levels 0 and 1 where the rest of Step 2.5 is skipped. A single Cargo.toml setting can flip the panic-safety story for the entire crate; agents must reason from the actual profile, not from defaults.
Read questdb-rs/Cargo.toml and questdb-rs-ffi/Cargo.toml and record, with file:line citations:
[profile.release], [profile.dev]). If panic = "abort" in either, every catch_unwind in that crate is a no-op for that profile and every reachable panic is a process abort. Agents 2, 3, and 4 (and the level-0 inline review) must not credit catch_unwind as a panic guard under panic = "abort". The only acceptable defense under abort-panic is proving no panic path exists.overflow-checks = false in release (the default), integer overflow wraps silently in release builds instead of panicking — bugs that look like panics in test builds disappear into wrong values in production. State which mode applies.[profile.*.package.*] overrides if present — a per-dependency profile can reintroduce unwinding for one crate even when the workspace defaults to abort.#[global_allocator] if defined anywhere in the workspace. A custom allocator changes the OOM behavior (some abort, some unwind, some return null).A review without this section is incomplete. State the panic mode in one line at the top of every Step 3 agent prompt so the agent reasons from the right premise.
For every production-code behavioral change, record: the changed symbol/path;
the exact test and search used to find it; why its assertion fails on regression;
supported reachability and affected users; applicable happy/error/NULL/boundary/
concurrency/resource dimensions; and a disposition of COVERED, CRITICAL GAP,
MODERATE GAP, ACCEPTED GAP, or EXEMPT. A Critical gap requires a reachable
material consequence such as data loss, host-process abort, security failure,
compatibility break, or unbounded resource loss. Keep covered, accepted, and
exempt rows private unless asked.
Every agent receives:
Cargo.toml (panic strategy, allocator, feature defaults, MSRV, profile overrides), a new #[global_allocator], or a new panic_handler retroactively changes the safety story for every existing function in the crate — not just the diff. When Cargo.toml, build scripts, or workspace-level config files appear in the diff, the review covers the panic/allocation/overflow contract of the entire affected crate, not just the touched lines. The same applies when 2.5e records a profile fact (e.g. panic = "abort") that invalidates existing safety patterns in untouched code.test_line_sender.cpp the new behavior of line_sender_buffer_column_f64 causes Y" is worth more than five findings inside the diff.Launch the following agents in parallel.
Agent 1 — Correctness & bugs: NULL/None handling, edge cases, logic errors, off-by-one, operator precedence, error paths, integer overflow/truncation, buffer length math. Cross-reference every changed symbol against its callsite inventory and verify the new behavior is correct at each callsite.
Agent 2 — Rust safety, panics, and crash surface: In a client library, anything that aborts the Rust side aborts the host process with no recovery. Flag every reachable instance of:
unwrap(), expect(), array indexing without bounds checks, panic!(), unreachable!(), todo!(), integer overflow in release mode, slice::from_raw_parts with invalid inputs, Mutex::lock().unwrap() on a poisoned mutex.std::process::abort(), libc::abort(), std::intrinsics::abort().Vec::with_capacity, Box::new, String::reserve, or similar sized by an untrusted length parameter. Rust's default allocator aborts on OOM — a caller passing a 100 GB length parameter is a crash, not a recoverable error. Check whether the FFI function validates length bounds before allocating.Drop impls, deeply nested data structures decoded from untrusted input.Drop impl while another panic is unwinding aborts the process. Flag any Drop impl that can panic (calls unwrap, indexes, allocates).unsafe: verify safety invariants are documented and upheld, check pointer validity, aliasing rules, lifetime correctness, dangling pointers, use-after-free, double-free, data races.include/questdb/ingress/*.hpp) is reachable from pure-C callers via inline forwarders. Any path where the wrapper can throw (std::bad_alloc, std::system_error, user-defined throw) and reach a C caller is undefined behavior. Verify wrapper functions called from C are noexcept or only invoked from C++ contexts.MSG_NOSIGNAL or mask SIGPIPE.Panic strategy is the foundation. Before reasoning about any panic guard, look up the panic setting from Step 2.5e:
panic = "abort", catch_unwind is a no-op — it cannot catch anything because nothing unwinds. Every reachable panic is a process abort regardless of where the catch_unwind is placed. The only acceptable defense is proving no panic path exists: front-load every length check, replace unwrap/expect/indexing on wire-derived or caller-supplied values with Result-returning equivalents, validate before allocating, use checked_* arithmetic. A catch_unwind wrapper in this mode is misleading documentation, not a safety net — flag it if it gives the reader false confidence.panic = "unwind", every extern "C" function must wrap its body in catch_unwind AND every Drop impl on the unwind path must be panic-free (double-panic aborts the process). Fallible operations must use Result/Option with proper error propagation.State which panic mode applies in the agent's first sentence. Every panic-related finding must be evaluated under the actual mode, not the textbook one.
Agent 3 — FFI boundary safety: Check every #[no_mangle] / extern "C" function. Verify: NULL pointer checks on all pointer arguments, proper error propagation across the FFI boundary (no panics escaping into C), correct ownership transfer semantics (who allocates, who frees), buffer length validation, string encoding correctness (UTF-8 ↔ C strings, NUL handling), and that the C header (include/questdb/ingress/line_sender.h) and C++ wrapper (include/questdb/ingress/line_sender.hpp + the split line_sender_core.hpp / line_sender_array.hpp / line_sender_decimal.hpp) accurately reflect the Rust implementation. If cbindgen.toml is involved, verify generated output matches handwritten headers.
Agent 4 — Concurrency & thread safety: Race conditions, Send/Sync bounds, shared mutable state, lock ordering, correct use of Arc/Mutex/RwLock, tokio runtime safety (blocking vs async calls), thread-safety of data structures. For C/C++ API: verify documented thread-safety guarantees match the implementation. Cross-reference every callsite from 2.5b for violations of the new concurrency contract.
Agent 5 — Resource management & memory: Leaks on all code paths (especially errors), Drop implementations, native memory management, buffer lifecycle, socket/connection cleanup on error paths, TLS session teardown. For C API: verify every allocation has a documented deallocation path, and error paths don't leak. Walk every callsite from 2.5b that constructs, owns, or transfers ownership of changed types and verify cleanup on all paths (Ok branch, ? early return, panic-unwind boundary).
Agent 6 — Performance & allocations: Unnecessary allocations on hot paths (buffer building, column writes, flushing), excessive copying, inefficient serialization, unnecessary syscalls, buffer growth strategy. For each new loop on the data path, analyze how it scales with realistic message volumes (millions of rows per flush, hundreds of columns). Flag any O(n²) pattern. Setup-path allocations (sender construction, configuration parsing) are acceptable; data-path allocations are not.
Agent 7 — Test review & coverage: Coverage gaps, error path tests, NULL/edge-case tests, boundary conditions, regression tests, test quality. Check:
questdb-rs/src/**/tests.rs and #[cfg(test)] mod tests blockscpp_test/test_line_sender.cppsystem_test/test.pyexamples/ still build and runCross-reference 2.5d: every cross-context exposure should have a test that exercises the changed symbol from that context. Missing tests for cross-context callsites is a high-priority finding.
Agent 8 — Public API ergonomics & cross-surface consistency: API ergonomics is mission-critical here, not cosmetic: an awkward or inconsistent public API leads users into data loss, silent misuse, and crashes. Review every public Rust item, extern "C" export, C header declaration, C++ wrapper method, and Python binding the PR adds or changes, against the surfaces that already exist. Use the API ergonomics & cross-surface consistency checklist below as your spec. Concretely:
TableName where its sibling takes &str/impl Into<String>, validates lazily where the sibling validates eagerly, or omits a control (timestamp column, overrides, ack level) the sibling exposes, is a finding.sync/commit/close, while a sibling commits implicitly. Silent semantic divergence between similarly-shaped methods (commit vs defer, idempotent vs not, replays vs not, clears buffer on error vs leaves it dirty) that the type system does not surface is the highest-severity ergonomic defect — graded by data-loss blast radius, never Minor.impl TryInto<TableName> / impl Into<String> so &str just works; replace always-passed sentinels (&[], None, 0) and double-wrapped knobs (Option<NonZeroUsize>) with defaulted methods or an options/builder type — consistent with the rest of the crate.#[non_exhaustive]; any commit/flush/ordering/ownership/lifetime contract the signature cannot encode must be documented on the item with a cross-reference to siblings that differ.Also cover the mechanical hygiene that used to live here: backward-compatible C/C++ headers (breaking changes must be intentional and called out in the PR body), /// docs on public Rust and Doxygen-style comments on C/C++ headers, no dead code or unused imports, and clippy/cargo fmt cleanliness.
Agent 9 — Cross-context caller impact: Walk the callsite inventory from 2.5b. For every callsite, fetch the surrounding code (the calling function plus its callers up two levels) and answer:
Drop impl) where the new behavior misbehaves even if the inputs are valid?extern "C" signatures: does the C header still match? Do the C++ wrapper and Python ctypes binding still pass the right types and lifetimes?flush called only when the sender is in a flushable state)?This agent's output is structured per callsite, not per failure mode. Each callsite gets a verdict: SAFE / CANDIDATE / NEEDS VERIFICATION. A CANDIDATE is an untrusted hypothesis for Step 3b.
This agent is not optional even when the diff is small. Small diffs to widely-used symbols (Buffer::column_*, Sender::flush, FFI exports) have the largest blast radius.
Agent 10 — Fresh-context adversarial: Dispatched separately from agents 1-9 to escape checklist anchoring. This agent operates under different rules from the rest:
The point of this agent is to surface hypotheses the structured agents cannot see because they are reasoning inside the same frame. Novelty and overlap determine investigation priority, not truth or severity.
Run this agent in parallel with agents 1-9. It is mandatory regardless of diff size.
Combine agent outputs into a private candidate ledger. Split compound claims, deduplicate them, record dependencies, and do not draft severity or report prose yet.
The parallel review agents work from the diff plus the change surface map and frequently produce false positives — especially around memory ownership, unsafe blocks, FFI lifecycle conventions, and Rust control-flow guarantees. Every candidate MUST be verified before it is reported.
Use HYPOTHESIS → FALSIFYING → PROVEN → ADMITTED. Omit a candidate when any
required premise remains unsupported. Behavioral candidates require: the exact
changed hunk or broken unchanged caller; a supported input/state producer; the
complete reachable path; observed head behavior; identical-trigger $BASE
behavior (or proof of a genuinely new surface); user-visible impact; the strongest
counterevidence attempted; and the command/test artifact with revision identity.
Race, ordering, retry, restart, filesystem, compatibility, and protocol-state
claims require executed evidence. Static compile/ABI/standards violations may cite
complete source proof instead. If base behaves the same or worse, the issue is not
a finding against this PR.
For each candidate in the private ledger:
? operator early returns, panic unwind). Check for Drop impls. Before claiming a leak between allocation and cleanup registration, verify that the intervening code can actually fail.usize::MAX, billions of columns), drop it.// SAFETY: comment.Classify each candidate as:
Move omitted false candidates to a separate "Downgraded" section at the end of the report. For each, give a one-line explanation of why it was dismissed. This lets the PR author verify the reasoning and catch verification mistakes.
Launch verification agents in parallel where candidates are independent. Each verification agent should read surrounding source files, not just the diff.
Review the diff for:
unwrap()/expect() in library code (only in tests, or on infallible paths with a // SAFETY: / // INVARIANT: justification)unsafe blocks have documented safety invariantsSend/Sync bounds on public typespanic = "abort", catch_unwind is a no-op and every reachable panic is a fatal escape; the FFI function must prove no panic path exists. Under panic = "unwind", every extern "C" function must wrap its body in catch_unwind.Anything that aborts the Rust side aborts the host process. The first check is the panic strategy itself — everything else is downstream of it.
panic = "abort", the entire catch_unwind defense collapses — every panic across the entire crate is fatal. Verify the profile before crediting any panic guard. A finding that says "the panic at X is caught by catch_unwind at Y" is incorrect under abort-panic.std::process::abort(), libc::abort(), std::intrinsics::abort()Drop impls, deeply nested untrusted inputDrop / double-panic during unwind — every Drop impl must be panic-freenoexcept or proven not to throwMSG_NOSIGNAL or mask SIGPIPEMutex::lock().unwrap() panics if the mutex is poisoned by a prior panic; use lock() with explicit poison handlingline_sender.h) and C++ wrapper (line_sender.hpp and split headers) match Rust implementation signaturescbindgen.toml produces output consistent with handwritten headers when both existSend boundaries.failed, delete SFA files, or convert a transient outage into permanent data loss./lifecycle/switch primary-to-replica and back without process restart, with at least one already-open client connection.Drop implementations correct and completeMission-critical for a client library: a confusing or inconsistent public API causes data loss, silent misuse, and crashes, so ergonomic and consistency defects are graded by user impact — not automatically filed under Minor. Review every public Rust item, extern "C" export, C header declaration, C++ wrapper method, and Python binding the PR adds or changes against the surfaces that already exist.
Consistency across surfaces (the dominant concern):
TableName where a sibling takes impl Into<String>/&str (or vice-versa), validates lazily where a sibling validates eagerly, or names/orders a shared parameter differently.flush_*, column_*, at*, *_new). A new write_arrow beside an existing flush_arrow_batch, or set_table beside table, is an inconsistency. C/C++/Python symbol names must mirror the Rust names per the existing convention.Ergonomics (the easy path must be the safe path):
sync/commit/flush/close) to avoid uncommitted/unacked/lost rows, and a sibling API does it implicitly, the asymmetry is a footgun — rank it by data-loss blast radius, not as a nit.impl TryInto<TableName> / impl Into<String> so &str works without TableName::new(x)? ceremony at every callsite — matching whatever the rest of the crate already accepts for that concept.&[], None, 0) are a smell; prefer a defaulted method or an options/builder type. Double-wrapped knobs like Option<NonZeroUsize> are awkward at the callsite — check whether a plain value with a documented default reads better.#[non_exhaustive]; options/builder types should accept new optional knobs without breaking existing callers. A new public enum that is not #[non_exhaustive] but plausibly will grow is a finding.clippy clean (no #[allow] attributes added without justification)cargo fmt appliedcpp_test/?system_test/?TODO, FIXME, HACK, XXX, and WORKAROUND comments. For each one found:
Present ONLY verified findings (false positives are excluded from Critical/Moderate/Minor). Structure as:
Classify by reachable user impact, not review category. Critical means material data loss/corruption, host crash or outage, undefined behavior/security failure, public compatibility break, unbounded resource loss, or a material hot-path regression. Moderate is bounded or developer-facing impact. Minor is cosmetic. Every behavioral finding must state the problem, net impact, decisive evidence, and identical-trigger base behavior.
Issues that must be fixed before merge. Each must include:
Issues worth addressing but not blocking.
Style nits and suggestions.
List only admitted Critical and Moderate gaps, with the recorded test search and failure link. Critical gaps block through the same correctness gate as defects.
Candidates from discovery that were dismissed after source code verification. For each, state:
基于 SOC 职业分类
